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Abstract Clinical guidelines summarise available evidence on medical treatment,
and provide recommendations about the most effective and cost-effective options
for patients with a given condition. However, sometimes patients do not desire the
best available treatment. Should doctors in a publicly-funded healthcare system ever
provide sub-optimal medical treatment? On one view, it would be wrong to do so,
since this would violate the ethical principle of beneficence, and predictably lead to
harm for patients. It would also, potentially, be a misuse of finite health resources. In
this paper, we argue in favour of permitting sub-optimal choices on the basis of
value pluralism, uncertainty, patient autonomy and responsibility. There are diverse
views about how to evaluate treatment options, and patients’ right to self-deter-
mination and taking responsibility for their own lives should be respected. We
introduce the concept of cost-equivalence (CE), as a way of defining the boundaries
of permissible pluralism in publicly-funded healthcare systems. As well as pro-
viding the most effective, available treatment for a given condition, publicly-funded
healthcare systems should provide reasonable suboptimal medical treatments that
are equivalent in cost to (or cheaper than) the optimal treatment. We identify four
forms of cost-equivalence, and assess the implications of CE for decision-making.
We evaluate and reject counterarguments to CE. Finally, we assess the relevance of
CE for other treatment decisions including requests for potentially superior
treatment.
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What should health professionals do if patients request medical treatment that is
contrary to the accepted standard? The professional may believe that the requested
option would be harmful (it would not yield the best outcome for the patient), and
wasteful—(given superior options it would not be the best use of limited resources).
Consider the following hypothetical cases (Box 1):
In the cases above, should the patients receive the treatment they are requesting?
One initial thought is that it might matter whether they are requesting treatment in a
private or public healthcare system. Choice about treatment is often seen as a
defining feature of private healthcare. Greater choice can be a major motivation for
taking out private health insurance [25].
In contrast, publicly-funded healthcare systems (PHS) do not routinely offer
choice around treatment. To ensure that patients receive consistent, high quality
care, PHS often develop and disseminate clinical guidelines that assess available
evidence and provide recommendations about optimal treatment (for example, the
National Institute for Health Care Excellence (NICE) in the UK).
In this paper, we will focus our attention on PHS. Our discussion will draw on the
example of the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK, since that is familiar to
us, and provides useful, relevant, and accessible examples of national best practice
Box 1 Requests for suboptimal treatment
Case A: drugs to reduce transfusion need
Jim is a 38 year old man who is scheduled to have an elective major operation. Jim is anxious about
his forthcoming surgery. In particular, he is worried about the possible need for a blood transfusion.
He would prefer not to be transfused even if he has significant blood loss during surgery. Jim has
read that recombinant Erythropoietin and supplemental iron would reduce his chance of needing a
transfusion [23].
However, Jim’s haemoglobin level is normal, and national guidance states clearly that medical
practitioners should not offer Erythropoietin to patients who are not anaemic [15].
Case B: smoking cessation
Julia is a 40 year old woman who has smoked heavily for 20 years. She strongly desires to give up
smoking, and has made many previous unsuccessful attempts to do so. Julia has gone to her GP to
request a drug to help her give up smoking. The GP offers her a prescription for Varenicline, a
nicotine partial agonist that has been shown to be effective. However, Julia has heard about a
naturally derived medicine (Cytisine). She strongly prefers natural remedies, and is worried about
side effects from Varenicline. Current evidence summaries acknowledge that Cytisine may be more
effective than Varenicline, however, because of a lack of large trials [24] there is some uncertainty
and therefore it is not recommended.
Case C: double embryo transfer
Jane and Peter are academics in their late thirties. They have been trying to conceive unsuccessfully
for several years. They are requesting IVF, and have specifically asked for two embryos to be
implanted. National guidelines and local policy strongly encourage single embryo transfer for
women of Jane’s age because of the increased risk of multiple birth with two embryo transfer, with
consequent increased maternal and fetal complications [20].
However, Jane is not concerned about the risk of multiple birth. She was a twin herself. She would
like to have several children, and is concerned that if she implants only a single embryo she will
have to pay for further IVF cycles (they have limited financial resources), and will need to take a
longer break from her career.
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clinical guidelines. However, the issues below are not restricted to one particular
PHS. They apply, for example, to Medicaid patients in the US, many of whom may
be able to access only treatments available through a managed care plan [41]. They
are also relevant for private healthcare systems, since such systems frequently make
stipulations about which treatments will be provided and which will not.
We concentrate on the boundaries of choice for competent adult patients.
However, the basic principles of the analysis will still be relevant for at least a
subset of paediatric treatment decisions.1
We restrict our discussion to conventional medical treatments that have been
scientifically evaluated to have some medical benefit relative to no treatment and are
prescribed or provided by registered health professionals. We will assume, for the
purpose of simplicity, the framework used in many PHS to appraise treatments in
terms of cost per quality-adjusted life year gained (Cost/QALY). It is not the
purpose of this paper to assess or analyse different methods for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of treatments; the framework of cost-equivalence could be applied to
other methods for assessing cost-effectiveness.
Finally, it is worth noting at this point what it might mean for a treatment to be
‘suboptimal’ (Table 1). Treatments can be inferior to other available options
because they yield a smaller benefit, because they increase risks for the patient,
because they are more costly, or because of relative lack of evidence.
Against Sub-optimal Treatment
There are two essential arguments in favour of health professionals (or health
systems) providing only optimal medical treatment according to their best
judgment.
Table 1 Different ways in which treatment might be suboptimal
Type of suboptimality Example
Reduced magnitude of
benefit
Smaller improvement in symptom scores
Reduced probability of
benefit
Reduced probability of live birth after in vitro-fertilisation
Reduced duration of benefit Reduced median survival with cancer treatment
Increased magnitude of
harm
Risk of death rather than risk of stroke
Increased probability of
harm
Increased probability of heart attack
Increased cost, but similar
effectiveness
Drug to reduce post-operative anaemia is considerably more expensive
than standard care, but doesn’t improve outcome (or does only by a very
small amount)
Reduced evidence Uncertainty about relative benefit/harm, or about costs
1 In children, there is an additional complexity, since their own wishes may be unknown, and there are
constraints to parents’ freedom to make medical decisions [47].
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First, health professionals have a duty to aid and not harm patients. The
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence lie at the heart of evidence-based
medicine. Doctors should critically and impartially assess evidence about medical
treatments in order to determine which treatment is best for a given condition, or for
a given group of patients [22].
The principles (or duties) of beneficence/non-maleficence do not mandate that
physicians always do the best possible. The best treatment may be unaffordable, or
may be very limited in availability. Rather, these principles require physicians to
provide the best and least harmful available treatment option(s).
The Optimal Treatment Principle: For a given condition, Publicly-funded
Healthcare Systems should provide only the most effective treatment that is
both available and affordable.2
Of course, the patient may decline this treatment. In such circumstances, the
value of autonomy comes into conflict with that of beneficence. For a competent
adult patient, such refusal should be respected. However, that does not negate the
importance of determining, recommending and providing (if desired) the best
available medical treatment. In Jim’s case, for example, best practice guidelines
recommend that he be offered tranexamic acid (a drug to reduce blood loss during
surgery) [15]. Intraoperative cell salvage (where blood lost during surgery is given
back to the patient) might be considered [15]. However, a physician might well feel
that Erythropoietin should not be provided because it would potentially impose risks
on Jim, for little or no benefit.
Second, health care providers should provide optimal treatment because this
represents the best use of limited medical resources. Publicly funded healthcare
systems have a finite budget, and there are constraints on the resources available to
treat patients. Providing optimal medical treatment represents an important way of
securing the greatest health benefit possible from this limited resource. This
includes attention to the cost of treatment, as well as to the benefit of providing
that treatment. These can be combined formally in appraisal of the cost-
effectiveness of treatment [31]. This also applies to private health insurance, since
such bodies have to make decisions about allocating the finite financial resources
gained from policy subscriptions. Traditionally, coverage decisions for insurers
have been based on evidence of effectiveness (rather than cost-effectiveness),
providing ‘‘medically necessary’’ therapies [17]. However, some have argued that
private insurers also need to explicitly take account of the cost-effectiveness of
treatments [17].
Cost-effectiveness is not the only priority for health systems. There may be
reasons to depart from it (for example, because of a desire to provide equality of
access to treatment, or priority to the worst off). Nevertheless, cost-effectiveness
represents a centrally important principle for public (and private) healthcare
systems.




Many publicly-funded healthcare systems apply a threshold to treatments. The
Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) represents the additional cost per
additional quality-adjusted life year compared with the standard of care. Those
treatments that provide sufficient incremental benefit (relative to their cost) are
funded [31]. Conversely, treatments that exceed the ICER threshold are not
provided. Countries vary in how they apply ICER thresholds, and the level at which
they apply. Which treatments count as optimal will depend on the ICER threshold
used and will depend on the available alternatives. As an example, the UK National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) does not usually recommend
provision of treatments assessed as having an incremental cost of than £20-30,000/
QALY [9, 13]. In Jim’s case, a relevant study (assessing the use of Erythropoietin
for mildly anaemic patients prior to orthopaedic surgery) assessed it as costing an
additional £1235 per patient, for a gain of 0.00006 QALYs [15]. This amounts to
more than £21million/QALY.
In Defense of Sub-optimal Treatment
There are strong reasons for physicians and PHS to endorse the Optimal Treatment
Principle. So why, then, should they consider providing sub-optimal treatment?
One reason is given by value pluralism: within any (democratic) society there
will be a plurality of value systems, and a diversity of views about how to live [44].
People’s views diverge about a range of fundamental questions, political, ethical
and religious. This diversity appears to be inevitable and irresolvable. It is not
possible to determine a single correct view or set of values. As a consequence,
negotiation, tolerance and compromise are necessary. As suggested by Table 1
above, there are different ways in which treatments may be judged to be superior or
inferior. Treatments will often be better in some ways, but worse in others. For
example, Jane and Peter place greater value on the potential benefit of having two
children (and twins) than on avoiding particular medical risks. Julia places greater
value on receiving a naturally derived treatment, than on the greatest scientific
evidence. Treatments that are most effective on average for a population will be not
always be most effective in light of the goals and values of specific individuals
within that population. Others in society may not share those values, but that does
not make them wrong. Furthermore, allowing choice causes patients to take more
responsibility for their health care decisions and increases participation in decision-
making.
A second, related justification for permitting sub-optimal treatment is based on
the value of patient autonomy. Even if people are mistaken in their factual beliefs
about treatment, or in the values that they apply to treatment decisions, in general
we think that competent patients’ decisions about medical treatment should be
respected.
Autonomy is often understood as a negative right – giving competent patients the
absolute freedom to refuse treatment that they do not desire, no matter how
beneficial it might be. It does not represent a positive right to demand whatever
medical treatment is desired [32]. However, a purely negative account of patient
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autonomy seems too thin. The value of autonomy lies in the importance of self-
government and freedom to live according to one’s goals [45]. Decisions by health
professionals and health systems that preclude options that are important to patients
significantly constrain self-government. When patients can choose according to
their values, they can take responsibility for their health care, and the results of it.
A third reason arises from uncertainty in determinations about optimal treatment.
Scientific studies allow comparison between different potential treatment options.
However, in many cases, there will be some significant uncertainty about these
estimates. (For example, it may be unclear whether data obtained in the context of a
randomized controlled trial can be extrapolated to a different setting or to the
general population). Even if such scientific uncertainty were minimal, other types of
uncertainty would remain. For example, evaluations of the impact of treatment on
quality of life are typically based on ratings by the general public of the value of
survival in different health states (described in terms of a combination of attributes)
[6]. Yet there can be significant differences in estimates of QALY using different
methods, or different populations; the precision of such estimations can obscure the
underlying uncertainty about how to assess quality of life, and how to incorporate it
into cost-effectiveness calculations. Uncertainty, in cost-effectiveness assessment
can generate different views about which treatments would be best.
Value pluralism, uncertainty about evidence, and genuine respect for patient
autonomy and responsibility suggest that physicians (and PHS) should be prepared
to provide at least some sub-optimal treatment options. But where should the
boundaries of those options be? Drawing on Mill, a liberal account of medical
treatment would permit patients to choose medical options, as long as they do not
cause harm to others [28].
Cost-equivalence
In a closed PHS, one important way in which treatment choices by an individual
could harm others is through consumption of limited resources. This also potentially
applies in private healthcare systems, since excessive costs of treatment for one
patient could be reflected in increased insurance premiums (or reduced coverage)
for others.
Of course, costs for individual patients do not necessarily translate to harms to
others [12]. In private systems, increased costs could lead to reduction in profits
(with no change in coverage for others). In publicly-funded healthcare systems,
increased costs could lead to a higher health budget being assigned, and reduced
funds available for other (non-health) priorities or to increased taxation. However,
in both systems, provision of more expensive options has the potential to lead to
harm to other patients via reduced access to treatment. This gives rise to one
principle that we could use to determine the permissibility of substitute treatment.
The Cost-Equivalence Principle: As well as providing the most effective,
available treatment for a given condition, Publicly-funded Healthcare Systems
should provide reasonable suboptimal medical treatments that are equivalent
in cost to (or cheaper than) the optimal treatment.
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We could apply this straightforwardly to treatment determinations. The idea of
cost-equivalence is that patients who request substitute treatments receive the same
(financial) support as they would have received if they had accepted the optimal
treatment. Their decision to choose substitute treatment does not require any
additional resources. It does not lead to other patients being denied treatment. This
seems, prima facie, to be a fair allocation of resources. It is also, at least from the
point of view of individual preferences Pareto Superior.3
Pure cost-equivalence (CE) (Table 2) focuses only on the cost of the requested
substitute treatment. If we consider a set of hypothetical suboptimal treatments
(Box 2), CE would support any treatments that are equal or lower in total cost than
the optimal treatment.
One potential concern about pure cost-equivalence is that it might require a
health system to provide a highly expensive treatment for very limited benefit (e.g.
Daxamab, Box 2). This seems counterintuitive. A second concern is that, contrary to
the claim above, such a policy could have implications for other patients. A policy
of pure cost-equivalence would lead to some patients being deprived of more
beneficial treatment, wherever it would increase the uptake of medical treatment.
For example, the annual budgetary impact of introducing Varenicline in the UK
NHS was estimated at £7 million per year by 2011 (after its introduction in 2007)
[43]. This was based on models assuming that 25% of eligible smokers would take
prescription treatment. However, we might imagine that if a PHS decides to provide
Cytisine as a cost-equivalent smoking cessation aid (case 2), a higher proportion of
smokers would potentially take up prescriptions (e.g. 30%). In that situation, pure
Table 2 Different potential versions of cost-equivalence
Variants of cost-equivalence
Pure cost equivalence (CE) Where PHS is prepared to provide treatment A, provide reasonable
substitute treatment B iff CostB is BCostA
Cost-effectiveness equivalence
(CEE)
Where PHS is prepared to provide treatment A, provide substitute




Where PHS is prepared to provide treatment A, provide substitute
treatment B iff CostB is BCostA and CostB/QALYB is BCost
Effectiveness Threshold**
Refusal cost-equivalence (RCE) Where the cost of refusing treatment is[cost of optimal treatment A,
and a PHS is prepared to absorb the costs of refusing treatment A,
provide substitute treatment B iff CostB is BCostrefusal
* Substitute treatments can be more cost effective but still sub-optimal if they are less effective overall
(and cheaper), or where there is uncertainty about effectiveness eg Cytisine
** The reason for restricting CEE and CETE to treatments that are less expensive than the optimal
treatment is because this ensures no negative impact on overall health budgets, and Pareto optimality.
Permitting requests for substitute treatment that are more expensive than the optimal treatment (albeit
within the ICER threshold) would lead to increased health expenditure
3 A Pareto Superior option is better for at least one individual, and not worse for anyone. Assuming that
the substitute treatment is preferred by the patient, and does not frustrate the desires of any other patients
for treatment, cost-equivalent substitute treatments are a Pareto improvement. (They may be Pareto
inferior in terms of health).
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cost-equivalence would potentially lead to an increase in the total budgetary impact.
In a closed publicly-funded healthcare system it would potentially affect the
availability of treatment for others. This would provide a non-paternalistic objection
to CE in some cases.
Refusal Cost-equivalence
In some circumstances optimal treatments will be cost-saving relative to not
providing the treatment [37]. For example, influenza vaccination in older patients
has been estimated to save $17 per person vaccinated [27]. Does that mean that sub-
optimal treatments cannot be cost-equivalent? There are two alternatives. The first
alternative would be to accept that in such circumstances sub-optimal treatments are
not cost-equivalent. If patients wish to receive them, they could pay the full cost
either within the PHS, or outside it (obtained privately). The second alternative is
more radical. It depends on whether it is permissible for patients to refuse treatment,
and whether they would be required to pay extra for any additional healthcare
expenses that this incurred. For example, imagine that Jim’s reason for not wanting
to have a blood transfusion were because he is a Jehovah’s Witness [37]. If he
sustains severe blood loss during his surgery (and declines transfusion), he may end
up having a more complicated and prolonged post-operative course [3].4 Should he
be required to pay for that additional expense? It is beyond the scope of this paper to
address the debate on individual responsibility and eligibility for publicly funded
healthcare [7]. However, if we think that it acceptable for the PHS to absorb the
costs of refusal of treatment, it would then seem unfair to impose additional costs
for suboptimal treatment. This gives rise to an additional cost-equivalence
principle—refusal cost-equivalence (RCE, Table 2). RCE could be combined with
other cost-equivalence principles.
Box 2 Hypothetical example of different novel cancer therapies (drug names are fictitious). Which
should be provided in a Publicly-funded Healthcare System? For the purposes of this example, it is not
necessary to specify the standard care. The new anti-cancer drugs will be prescribed in addition to
standard care (not replacing standard care)
A public healthcare system is evaluating whether to fund new life extending cancer treatments. Various
supplementary treatments have been assessed in comparison with the current standard of care
Axemab costs an additional £10,000 per treatment, and on average extends life by an additional 1
quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)
Boximab costs the same amount, but extends life by only 0.5QALY on average
Cliximab is more expensive, but also more effective than treatment A. It costs £20,000 per treatment, but
extends life for 1.5 QALYs*
Daxamab costs £10,000 per treatment, but extends life for only one week
* Cliximab is the most effective treatment, and falls within the incremental cost-effectiveness threshold
for the UK. Axemab, Boximab and Daxamab may be cost-equivalent (depending on the version of cost-
equivalence used). See Table 3
4 There is some evidence to suggest that patients who refuse transfusion actually have better outcomes




Should a PHS provide a very ineffective suboptimal treatment? If we are serious about
value pluralism, and autonomy perhaps societies should be prepared to respect a patient’s
decision about treatment, even where this diverges substantially from the choices that
others would make. Such choices would still potentially be Pareto improvements. But
one question is whether Daxamab represents a reasonable substitute treatment.
In the above account we proposed that PHS should provide reasonable cost-
equivalent treatments. Defining this element is challenging, and may not be possible
without begging the question. For many treatments there will be different views
about whether or not they are reasonable.
Here are two possible ways of defining reasonable suboptimal treatment.
Pragmatic Account
A Reasonable suboptimal treatment is one that: i. has been scientifically
appraised, and there is reliable evidence about both its effectiveness and cost
and ii. evidence suggests (though may not be conclusive) that it is more
beneficial (relative to harms) than no treatment and iii. at least some qualified
medical practitioners are prepared to provide the treatment.
The first condition above is necessary for cost-equivalence to be assessed. When
PHS considers the cost of treatments, they must take into account the up-front costs
of the treatment and the long-term costs of illness and complications arising
subsequent to providing the treatment. Sub-optimal substitutes may be cost-
equivalent in the short term, but could be more expensive in the long-term if they
lead to a greater burden of illness or to more medical complications. If there is
evidence of greater long-term costs associated with a sub-optimal substitute those
should be included into an assessment of whether it is cost-equivalent. Conversely,
if there were no scientific evidence about the effects or costs of a treatment it will be
impossible to assess whether providing it within a PHS would be permissible.
Why require even a minimal level of evidence of benefit? We might justify this in
terms of the reasons for providing care within a PHS at all. Treatments are provided
because they potentially contribute to a patient’s health and wellbeing. If there is no
scientific evidence of health benefit, on this account there is no positive reason to
provide it. (Although we have focused discussion in this paper on conventional
medical treatment, this requirement would potentially exclude many complemen-
tary or alternative medicines).
On the first two conditions, it may be reasonable to provide the hypothetical
cancer treatment Daxamab (Box 2)—but there would also need to be a professional
willing to prescribe it. The fact that professionals will provide it does not provide a
guarantee of reasonableness (the professionals might hold unreasonable views),
however, the absence of professionals willing to provide a given treatment might be
thought to provide fairly reliable evidence that this is not a reasonable option. Even
if it were reasonable, if there are no health professionals willing to provide the




An alternative approach to determine reasonableness would draw on accepted
principles of determining and comparing cost-effectiveness of interventions. As a
minimum, an intervention that has equivalent effect (relative to cost) to the optimal
treatment, would be clearly reasonable (cost-effectiveness equivalence, CEE,
Table 2). A policy of CEE would avoid the problem noted above that in some
situations pure cost equivalence could impact the availability of treatment for other
patients. It would allow patients to choose suboptimal substitute treatments, but it
would prevent them from choosing less cost-effective treatments. This would have
the advantage of ensuring that the health system allocated resources consistently and
secured the greatest health benefit for the money invested in healthcare.
Yet, one concern with CEE is that it may be unduly restrictive. If an incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) threshold is used to guide the provision of treatment,
we might expect that non-funded treatments are at or above the ICER threshold. In
that case, it would be Pareto superior to allow sub-optimal choices as long as they
do not exceed this level. This would yield a policy of cost-effectiveness threshold
equivalence (CETE, Table 2).5
Table 3 summarises the implications of these different policies for our
hypothetical new drugs.
Table 3 Choosing suboptimal treatments. The implications of 4 different policies on provision of
hypothetical drugs
Axemab Boxemab Cliximab Daxamab
Cost (pounds) 10,000 10,000 20,000 10,000
Effect (QALY benefit) 1 0.5 1.5 0.02
Cost/QALY (pounds)* 10,000 20,000 13,333 500,000
Optimal treatment 4
CE 4 4 4 4
CEE 4 4
CETE 4 4 4
Optimal treatment (highlighted in bold)—Treatment that secures the greatest absolute health benefit is
defined as optimal (as long as it lies within the ICER threshold)
CE Pure cost equivalence; (any substitute that is equally or less costly than optimal treatment will be CE)
CEE Cost-effectiveness equivalence (any substitute that has a equal or lower Cost/QALY than the
optimal treatment will be CEE)
CETE Cost-effectiveness Threshold Equivalence (any substitute that is equal or less costly than the
optimal treatment and falls within the ICER threshold will be CETE)
* Incremental cost-effectiveness—compared with standard treatment
4 Indicates that the drug would be provided
5 Note that in assessing whether suboptimal treatments fall within the incremental cost-effectiveness
threshold, these treatments should be compared with no treatment or standard treatment, not with the
optimal treatment. Since these treatments are (by definition) suboptimal, they will yield a negative value




Our accounts of reasonableness should be seen as complementary rather than in
competition. The pragmatic account would be a valuable rule of thumb, but the
notion of reasonable cost-effective substitutes might be used to help professionals
decide whether or not they should offer a suboptimal treatment.
Note that in our account of cost-equivalence, we focus on the reasonableness of
treatment substitutes, rather than the reasonableness of the request. Our focus on
reasonableness of treatment is deliberate and has two advantages. First, it is
considerably easier and less controversial to determine reasonable medical treatments
(at least on the definition that we have provided) than to distinguish between
reasonable and unreasonable justifications. For example, would it make Jim’s request
reasonable if he were concerned about the risk of transmission of a novel (not yet
discovered) blood-borne infection through transfusion? Would his request be
reasonable if it were based on a religious doctrine? Some might regard these
alternative justifications as reasonable, while others would not. Our account sidesteps
those questions. Second, determining the reasonableness of treatment is more reliable,
and less malleable than determining the reasonableness of a request. Third,
determining the reasonableness of specific treatments potentially avoids problems of
inconsistency between clinicians in determining the reasonableness of specific
requests. If a PHS determines that Erythropoietin is a reasonable (if sub-optimal)
option pre-operatively for patients with mild/no anaemia, then there is less risk that
whether Jim’s request will be granted will depend on whether or not he finds a
sympathetic practitioner.
Applying Cost-equivalence
Whichever cost-equivalence policy is adopted, there are several different ways in
which cost-equivalence could impact on decisions about treatment.
Binary Cost-equivalence
The most obvious way of applying cost-equivalence would be in a simple binary
fashion: suboptimal treatment would be provided if it is below the Cost Equivalence
threshold. If the suboptimal treatment were above the threshold, it would not be
provided.
Cost-equivalence Through Altered Duration/Dosage
However, it might still be possible to achieve cost-equivalence for more expensive
suboptimal treatments by providing them in a reduced quantity. For example, one
randomized trial of treatments for lower back pain compared exercise prescriptions
with massage or with various durations of lessons in Alexander technique [18]. In
the trial, 6 sessions of massage was more expensive, but also less effective than 6
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lessons in the Alexander technique. On the basis of evidence like this, a PHS might
regard massage as suboptimal, and decide not to publicly fund it. But if a patient
with chronic back pain strongly preferred massage over Alexander technique
lessons, one cost-equivalent alternative would be to fund a shorter course of
massage (e.g. 4 or 5 sessions of massage).
For suboptimal treatments that are within the cost-equivalence threshold, one
possibility is that cost-equivalence may allow an increased dose or duration of
cheaper treatment. For example, recall the case of Julia, who is unable to access
treatment with Cytisine to help stop smoking. Currently, the cost of a standard
course of Varenicline for smoking cessation is £163.80, while the cost of
Cytisine is only £16.79 [24]. On a pure CE policy, it would appear reasonable to
provide a considerably longer (even ninefold) course of Cytisine in place of
Varenicline.
Cost-equivalence Through Reduced Price
Finally, for suboptimal treatments that are not currently cost-equivalent it may be
possible to achieve cost-equivalence through a price reduction.
There are two ways of achieving such a price reduction. It might occur through
negotiation. For example, a PHS might negotiate with a pharmaceutical company to
reduce the unit price of the substitute drug—until it reached the cost-equivalent
price. Alternatively, PHS (or insurers) might agree to subsidise part of the cost of a
treatment—up to the relevant cost-equivalence point, with the patient paying a top-
up amount or co-payment. Table 4 illustrates the different levels of top-up (or
negotiated discount) required for our hypothetical drugs, on the basis of different
policies.
Table 4 Co-payment for suboptimal treatments. The implications of 4 different policies on provision of
hypothetical drugs
Axemab Boxemab Cliximab Daxamab
Cost (pounds) 10,000 10,000 20,000 10,000
Effect 1 0.5 1.5 0.02
Cost/QALY (pounds)* 10,000 20,000 13,333 500,000
Optimal treatment 4
CE 4 4 4 4
CEE 4 **£3333 4 **£9733
CETE 4 4 4 **£9400
Optimal treatment is highlighted in bold
* Incremental cost-effectiveness—compared with standard treatment
4 Indicates that the drug would be provided without co-payment





Objectivism and Strength of Claims
Cost equivalence respects the subjective preferences of patients for suboptimal
treatment. However, one reason to resist cost-equivalence might be a belief that the
strength of a claim for medical treatment (and the priority that should be given to it)
is ultimately based upon its objective rather than its subjective value. For example,
Scanlon argues that ‘‘[t]he strength of a stranger’s claim on us for aid in the
fulfillment of some interest depends upon what that interest is and need not be
proportional to the importance he attaches to it.’’ [38] Some may feel that patients’
claims to suboptimal treatment are weaker or less urgent than the claims of other
patients for (objectively) optimal treatment. However, the arguments advanced in
favour of cost equivalence are independent of whether the value or benefit of
treatment is objectively or subjectively conceived. We are not endorsing subjec-
tivism or relativism about health benefits. On the contrary, we accept that PHS are
justified in evaluating treatments in terms of objective benefits.
If we take Scanlon’s argument to mean that only claims to treatment that are
linked to objective benefit are important, some suboptimal treatments (at least those
that are cost-effectiveness-equivalent) should still be provided (for example, in
reduced dose or for reduced duration see ‘‘Reasonable Cost-effective Substitutes’’).
However, we have argued that uncertainty about the benefit of different treatments,
the value of autonomy and respect for plural values gives us strong reason to accept
and respect claims for cost-equivalent but objectively suboptimal treatment.
Complicity in Harmful Choices
One concern about providing sub-optimal treatments is that this would encourage
patients to make unwise choices or make the physician morally complicit in them.
For example, Jane and Peter’s obstetrician may feel strongly that it would be wrong
to implant two embryos.
We have earlier suggested that restricting patients’ options for their own benefit
is unreasonably paternalistic. However, in the context of exploitative contracts,
Shiffrin has argued that refusals that are motivated by concern to avoid personal
complicity can be justified without being a form of paternalism [39]. On that basis,
perhaps Jane and Peter’s obstetrician would be justified in refusing to implant two
embryos because she judges it to be incompatible with her professional role?
Yet, providing a treatment option, after counseling and full information provision
is not the same thing as supporting a treatment option. If it were an option for Jane
and Peter to have double embryo transfer, it would be entirely reasonable (and
compatible with their professional role) for a physician who believes that the
decision is unwise to counsel against such a choice [35, 36]. Moreover, it is not clear
that suboptimal (and cost-equivalent) treatment options are immoral and therefore
able to generate a justifiable sense of complicity. If it is wrong for physicians or
PHS to provide a suboptimal medical treatment (that is cost-equivalent and hence
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will not harm others) that can only be because of concern for the wellbeing of the
patient. It is hard to see how that is not a form of paternalism.
Indeed, there are three ways in which our proposal might potentially lead to
better, less harmful choices. The first is that disclosure of all reasonable options
respects patients’ autonomy fully, and is valuable even if patients subsequently
choose the recommended (optimal) treatment. By giving reasonable options, it
encourages patients to take responsibility for their treatment, rather than acquiescing
to the only option offered. Second, failure to provide substitutes may encourage an
even worse choice—of forgoing treatment. Third, failing to provide options may
lead patients to seek those options from other providers—where it is possible that
they will not receive the best advice about treatment. For example, Jane and Peter
may choose to travel overseas to access IVF, and end up having double embryo
transfer or even four or five embryo transfer because of unregulated treatment and
poor counseling [11].
Harmful Externalities
We have argued that suboptimal cost-equivalent treatments should be provided
since they will not cause harm to others. However, suboptimal treatment could
cause harm in other ways. For example, a less effective form of a vaccine may be
considerably less effective at generating herd immunity, or a less effective treatment
for HIV might lead to more transmission of the virus to third parties.
One response to these concerns would be to take into account the costs of
externalities in assessing whether or not a treatment is cost-equivalent. A flu vaccine
that is much less effective may not be cost-equivalent if it leads to more cases of
symptomatic flu in contacts of the patient.
However, if a less effective form of treatment causes harmful externalities of this
sort it is highly likely that treatment refusal would cause even greater harm. That
should lead us to ask whether it is permissible to refuse treatment. If it is not
permissible to refuse treatment, it may not be permissible to receive suboptimal
treatment either. It refusal is allowed, the relevant question may be whether the
suboptimal treatment is refusal-cost-equivalent.
Against Co-payment
One objection to cost-equivalence would be on the basis of ethical concerns about
equality within a Publicly-funded Healthcare System [40, 46]. Some argue that it is
unjust for patients with greater financial resources to be able to access options
within a PHS that are not available to all [5].
However, this concern would not create a distinct objection to cost-equivalence
in countries that already permit co-payments for some medical treatments in the
PHS (USA, Canada, Australia, many others) [34], nor for private health care, where
co-payments are commonly applied. This objection would also not prevent the use
of cost-equivalence without co-payment (for example, where the suboptimal
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treatment is less expensive e.g. Cytisine, or by reducing dose/duration of treatment
funded).
It is also not clear that the standard objections to co-payment provide convincing
ethical arguments against cost-equivalence for sub-optimal treatment (Table 6 in
Appendix 1). In particular, co-payment for treatments that are judged to be
suboptimal, cannot increase inequality in health outcomes. Indeed, since wealthier
patients may be able to choose inferior treatments, and thus secure for themselves
worse health, a contrario, equality provides an argument in favour of cost-
equivalence through co-payment!
Supplementary Rather than Substitute Treatment
The approach that we have described would not apply to cases where patients desire
sub-optimal treatments in addition to the most effective available treatment. For
example, Julia might request Cytisine to help her stop smoking after previously
having tried Varenicline. Where a suboptimal treatment is requested in addition to
standard treatment, it will not be cost-equivalent. In that case, patients would be
required to pay all of the cost of the supplementary treatment.
Supplementary treatment could be converted into substitute treatment. Patients
might choose to forego certain existing treatment options in order to gain access to
their desired suboptimal treatment. For example, Jim might refuse transfusion in
order to gain access to Erythropoietin. This might lead to two qualms. It might lead
some patients to manipulate the cost-equivalence system by declining future
treatments, but later revoking their choice if they needed to. Alternatively, patients
like Jim might genuinely change their minds about therapy once they require it, and
physicians may feel compelled to give the treatment.
In situations where patients are contemplating foregoing beneficial treatment, as
is presently the case, physicians should strongly discourage such choices, but
ultimately should respect the patient’s autonomous decision to do so. If Jim declines
transfusion, but later has become severely anaemic, the physician should encourage
Jim to accept a transfusion. At that point, there would be the option of
retrospectively charging a co-payment for the Erythropoietin, or of waiving the
co-payment on compassionate grounds. If a large number of patients end up
changing their minds about treatment, that could be incorporated into the costs of
substitute treatment—that may render the alternative non-cost-equivalent.
Further Applications of Cost-equivalence
Cost-equivalence Between Patient Groups
Some treatments are less beneficial than others, and an efficient PHS might choose
only to provide the most effective treatments (call this Intrapersonal Optimal
Treatment). We have argued that Cost equivalence would allow patients to access
desired suboptimal treatments without thereby harming any other patients.
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However, there is an alternative possible application of cost-equivalence in a
setting where sub-optimal treatments are sometimes not provided in a PHS.
Given scarce public health resources, some patients would have less benefit from
treatment than other patients. PHS may decide on the basis of cost-effectiveness
to allocate treatment only to subgroups of patients with a higher likelihood of
benefit (we could call this Interpersonal Optimal Treatment). For example, the
chance of live birth with in vitro fertilization varies with maternal age. In 2010
in the UK, for women aged under 35, 32% of IVF cycles (with own eggs)
resulted in live birth, compared with only 14% for women aged 40-42, and 2%
for women aged over 45 [19]. A number of countries restrict access to IVF based
on maternal age [14]. Although there are a variety of different possible rationales
for such a policy [29], one potential ethical justification is on the basis that the
lower effectiveness of IVF for older women justifies giving them a lower priority
for treatment.
Cost-equivalence might be used to increase access to desired treatment for
patients in worse prognostic groups. That could be in three ways:
First, on Pure Cost-Equivalence grounds, equal access to treatment might be
provided regardless of prognosis. That would offer a more egalitarian approach to
allocation, though with the implication that less benefit overall would result from
providing treatment. It might mean providing publicly funded IVF in situations with
very low chance of success.
Second, as noted above, Cost-Effectiveness Equivalence can be achieved by
adjustment of the duration or dose of treatment. One possibility, then, would be to
provide lower duration or quantity of treatment for patients with a worse prognostic
group. Indeed, the UK policy on public access to IVF appears to do just this. UK
national guidance recommends a maximum of three cycles of IVF for women aged
less than 40, while offering one cycle to women aged 40–42 and none to
women[ 42.
Third, it would be possible to achieve Cost-Effectiveness Equivalence for
patients with worse prognosis by reduction in the price of treatment. This could be
achieved through negotiation6 or co-payment. Co-payment as a means for patients
(in worse prognostic groups) to access treatment might be thought to raise more
egalitarian concerns than in the intrapersonal cases of sub-optimal treatment.
However, in the case of IVF, it is already the case that wealthier patients are able to
access private fertility treatment that is denied to less well off patients. Given that
co-payments would reduce the cost burden to patients, they would be preferable
(from the point of view of equality) to the status quo.7
Further potential implications of cost-equivalence for IVF policy are explored in
Table 5.
6 Manufacturers might agree, for example, to provide discounted treatment on compassionate grounds to
patients in worse prognostic groups.
7 One further possible form of price reduction that would not raise the same egalitarian concerns is third-
party co-payment. For example, a charity might elect to subsidise treatment for patients in worse
prognostic groups—providing the co-payment to make it possible for them to access treatment. In such a




We have focused in this paper on patient requests for sub-optimal treatments.
However, a more common dilemma may arise where patients request treatment that
is potentially more effective than the current default treatment, yet is not available
in the PHS. More effective therapies might not be provided because they have not
yet been adequately evaluated. There may be insufficient evidence for the PHS to be
sure that they are optimal (they would thus fit within our definition of suboptimal
treatment, Table 1). Alternatively, there may be clear evidence of benefit, yet the
cost of the treatments are such that they exceed the ICER threshold, and thus are
judged to be unaffordable in the PHS.
Consider the following:
Jason is a 50 year old man who has recently diagnosed hepatitis C infection,
genotype 2. He has been researching treatments for this infection, and has
read national guidance recommending treatment with a new expensive anti-
viral drug (sofosbuvir) for patients like him who do not have liver disease [1].
This treatment would give him the best chance of cure of his hepatitis, and has
lower side effects compared with the previous standard of care (interferon)
[26]. However, he does not have health insurance, and his PHS (Medicaid)






1. Equal access to IVF (regardless of age) 4
2. Prognosis-adjustment. The quantity of publicly funded IVF
could be linked more directly to the probability of live birth,
and take into account a wider range of factors predicting
probability of live birth
4
3. Co-payment. Patients would pay a variable co-payment to
reflect the chance of live birth. Those with a low chance of
live birth would pay a larger proportion of the cost of
providing IVF
4
4. Discounted IVF. If cheaper forms of IVF become available,
women with lower chance of live birth would be able to
access CEE equivalent IVF by using cheaper techniques
(e.g. [4])
4
5. Permit publicly funded IVF using donor eggs for older
women*
4 4
* The chance of live birth using donor eggs appears to be related to donor age, not maternal age [30, 42].
If the justification for denying IVF to older women is on the basis of reduced chance of live birth, it would




will only fund the more expensive treatment for patients who already have
liver disease [2]. He asks his physician to prescribe Sofosbuvir.
The above analysis of CE suggests a number of principles that might be applied
to requests for supra-optimal treatment like Jason’s.
Where patients are requesting reasonable supra-optimal treatment as a substitute
to existing therapy, it would be fair to provide the treatment if it were cost-
equivalent. That could apply either to therapies with little evidence to support them,
or to more expensive therapies. On the account of reasonableness given above, there
would need to be some scientific evidence of benefit (relative to no treatment), and
sufficient evidence of effect and cost to assess cost-equivalence. Thus, this would
apply to some novel therapies, but exclude experimental treatment with little or no
published experience. Cost equivalence (either CE/CEE or CETE) could be
achieved through reduction in dosage/duration, through negotiation or through co-
payment. In Jason’s case, if he were to decline interferon treatment, he would be
required to pay a co-payment for Sofosbuvir (discounted by the price of Interferon,
see also Appendix 2).
In contrast, if the patient were to request the new treatment as a supplement to
existing treatment, it would need to be incrementally cost-effective and cost-
equivalence would not apply.
Again, the egalitarian objections to co-payment apply more forcefully to supra-
optimal treatment than to sub-optimal treatment. However, as noted above in the
context of IVF, given that such treatments are already available (in many cases) for
patients who are willing to pay for them, cost-equivalence and co-payment
potentially reduce inequality relative to the status quo by increasing accessibility to
patients on low incomes.
Conclusions
There are good reasons for Publicly-funded Healthcare Systems and health
professionals to seek out and to provide the best available, affordable medical
treatment to patients. However, some patients request treatment that might be
judged sub-optimal from a medical point of view. We have argued in favour of
supporting patients’ access to desired suboptimal treatments. Determination that
treatment is optimal involves evaluating different outcomes, and potentially trading
off different values. Value pluralism implies that there may be a range of different
reasonable answers. We should respect and accommodate patients’ autonomous
wishes and value judgments as long as their decisions do not cause harm to others.
Offering a range of treatments allows patients to match therapy to their values,
encouraging patients to participate in and take responsibility for their treatment
choices.
We have proposed the concept of cost-equivalence as a means of defining the
boundaries of permissible value pluralism within PHS. We distinguished between
pure cost-equivalence, cost-effectiveness equivalence and cost-effectiveness thresh-
old equivalence. Pure cost-equivalence is attractively simple to apply, and does not
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involve any evaluation of the effect of treatment. In some situations it would be
Pareto-superior. Cost-Effectiveness Equivalence and Cost-Effectiveness-Threshold
Equivalence provide more restrictive boundaries on access to sub-optimal
treatments, but ensure that PHS achieve a reasonable health benefit overall and
provide a simple way to assess the reasonableness of substitute treatments.
In situations where the PHS is prepared to absorb the costs of refusing treatment,
Refusal Cost-equivalence may be a useful additional principle.
Cost-equivalence could be used in a simple binary form, to adjudge the
permissibility of providing treatment substitutes. It might also allow more expensive
(or less effective treatments) to be provided for a shorter duration or in a smaller
quantity. Cost-equivalence could also be achieved for sub-optimal treatments
through price reduction (via negotiation or co-payment).
We have identified and responded to a number of potential counter-arguments to
cost-equivalence. We suggest that none of them provide convincing reasons to
reject our proposal. Finally, we have explored the potential use of cost-equivalence
in interpersonal allocation, and in deciding about supra-optimal treatment.
In our diverse, multicultural societies, it is simply not credible that there could be
a single best answer to the question of which treatment a patient should receive. At
the same time, there is a need for PHS to rationally appraise different treatments,
and to consistently and fairly allocate them, given finite resources. It is appropriate
for PHS to identify, recommend and provide treatments that appear to offer the
greatest achievable benefit. However, there is also a need to respect and support
patients who make a different determination. Cost-equivalence provides a sound,
fair, and rational way of doing that.
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One way that Sofosbuvir could be cost equivalent would be if future costs of liver
transplantation were factored into the cost of Interferon. For example, some models
of Hepatitis C treatment suggest that routine funding of Sofosbuvir would avert
almost 6000 cases of hepatocellular carcinoma and 121 liver transplants for every
100,000 50-year old patients treated [8]. This might make Sofosbuvir overall a cost-
effective strategy. Alternatively, Jason might choose to waive his future access to
transplantation in order to access the more expensive drug now. However, it is not
clear that would be compatible with cost-equivalence as described here. It would
also raise the possibility of him later changing his mind.
Table 6 Arguments and counterarguments around co-payments for cost-equivalence
Arguments against cost-equivalence co-payment Counter-arguments (in favour of cost-equivalence
co-payment)
Egalitarian
Co-payments are unfair. They mean that wealthier
patients are able to access treatments that less-
well-off patients cannot afford [5].
Public health care should provide the same
treatment to all
Inequality already exists. Patients can access
treatments in the private system (if they can
afford it). Co-payments reduce inequality by
reducing the cost burden of such choices.
Levelling down equality benefits no patients [10],
but restricts choices for some
Cost-burden
It is objectionable that patients might end up
accruing very large medical bills in order to
access treatment
Patients would not need to pay anything for the
most effective available treatment.
Some patients already accrue large bills (for private
treatment or complementary medicine)
Co-payments would reduce the bills for patients
who would choose suboptimal treatments
Market effects
PHS that apply strict cost-thresholds to medicines
are able to negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies to reduce their prices (below the ICER
threshold). Co-payments would reduce the
incentive for companies to drop prices, and
potentially deprive other patients of treatment
[21]
The number of patients choosing suboptimal
treatments is likely to be low (compared to the
size of the PHS)—therefore having little impact
on market negotiations of the PHS [46].
On the other hand, if there were a large number of
patients choosing co-payments for desired (but
suboptimal) treatment, this would suggest that
(a) many individuals judged the level of
copayment acceptable, and (b) the PHS should
reconsider its decision not to provide it
Slippery Slope
Permitting co-payments (for sub-optimal
treatment) would lead to wider use of co-
payments within the PHS, and to progressive
reduction in the funding and effectiveness of the
PHS
Co-payments already exist in many PHS for some
elements of healthcare (e.g. in the UK for
dentistry/opticians). They have not led to a
progressive decline in PHS.
Co-payments for optimal treatment can be
distinguished from co-payment for sub-optimal
treatment. Permitting one, does not necessarily






Liver transplant: $228,000 (in first year)
Sofosbuvir/Ribavirin is less expensive than Interferon/Ribavirin plus liver
transplantation.
However, the probability of requiring a liver transplant for a patient with hepatitis
C receiving Interferon is low (approximately 0.1%) [8]. If future treatments
(refused) are discounted by the probability of them being required, the per patient
cost of Interferon plus transplant is $24,528.
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